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COMMENTS
DIVISION OF MILITARY RETIREMENT PAY
UPON DIVORCE*
In 1981, the Supreme Court rendered a decision prohibiting
state courts from dividing, as marital property, military retire-
ment pay upon divorce. in response to the overwhelming public
outcry, Congress has enacted a law which effectively overturns
the Supreme Court's ruling. This comment discusses the law
prior to this opinion, the opinion itself, the controversy it pro-
voked andfinally, the law it initiated
I. INTRODUCTION
State courts have traditionally exercised almost exclusive jurisdic-
tion in determining the proper division of property upon the dissolu-
tion of a marriage. Depending upon the individual jurisdiction, courts
have generally divided both private and government pensions the same
as other marital property. Despite the federal government's normal
practice of noninvolvement in the field of domestic relations, in Mc-
Carty v. McCarty' the United States Supreme Court held that military
retirement pay constituted the personal and nondivisible entitlement of
a member of the military. Although Congress had been silent on the
issue of preemption, the Court further concluded that state divorce
courts are preempted from treating military retirement pay similar to
ordinary pension plans. The decision generated a great deal of criti-
cism, resulting in a law which returns jurisdiction to the state divorce
courts and effectively overrides the holding of McCarty.
This comment discusses the division of marital property upon di-
vorce, with emphasis on the distribution of pensions and, in particular,
military retirement pay.2 McCarty will be analyzed in light of the pre-
cedent it has deviated from, the reactions it has provoked, the concerns
it has raised, and the legislation it has generated.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Division of Marital Property in General
Formulating a just division of marital property is one of the most
important functions performed by state divorce courts.3 The power to
determine spousal interest in marital property is derived mainly from
* The author of this comment was given the SCRIBES Society Award, Spring 1983,
which recognizes outstanding writing contributions.
1. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
2. This comment is national in scope, although Maryland court decisions are period-
ically discussed in examples.
3. Marital property is that property interest one acquires by reason of a marital rela-
tion. H. MARSH, JR., MARITAL PROPERTY IN CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1, at 11
(1952); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258 (1971).
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the local state law.' Because strict common law states, equitable distri-
bution states, and community property states define and distribute
marital property differently, an understanding of these doctrines is nec-
essary for a complete discussion of the property distribution set out in
McCarty v. McCarty. 
5
The English common law concept of marital property has been
adopted by the majority of American states.' Under that view, the hus-
band and wife were originally considered one legal entity,7 with the
wife having no separate legal existence from that of her husband.' The
husband could mortgage, sell, or dispose of all property at will, the wife
being wholly under his dominion.9
Married Women's Property Acts were enacted in an attempt to
elevate the wife to an equal position with that of her husband regarding
the acquisition, ownership, and consequence of her separate property.'o
Despite these acts, the presumption remained that all marital property
was acquired, and hence, owned by the husband." Consequently,
upon divorce the wife could be granted maintenance or dower, but the
4. See Menor v. Menor, 154 Colo. 475, 480, 391 P.2d 473, 476 (1964); Joyce v. Joyce,
10 Md. App. 516, 523, 276 A.2d 692, 697 (1970); Melamed v. Melamed, 286
N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn. 1979); Halla v. Halla, 200 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 1972);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 258(1) (1971).
5. 453 U.S. 210 (1981). Compare Martin v. Soden, 81 Idaho 274, 284, 340 P.2d 848,
854 (1959) (community property jurisdiction) with Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d
1018, 1020 (Me. 1980) (equitable distribution jurisdiction) and Pierce v. Pierce,
274 S.E.2d 514 (W.Va. 1981) (strict common law jurisdiction).
6. E.g., Joyce v. Joyce, 10 Md. App. 516, 517, 276 A.2d 692, 693-94 (1970); Newberg
v. Babowicz, 401 Pa. 146, 150, 162 A.2d 662, 663-64 (1960). See generally Freed &
Foster, Divorce in the Ffty States. An Overview as ofAugust 1, 1981, 7 FAM. L.
REP. (BNA) No. 49, at 4049 (Oct. 20, 1981).
7. Jones v. Jones, 293 Ala. 39, 42, 299 So.2d 729, 732 (1974); Swan v. Walden, 156
Cal. 195, 196, 103 P. 931, 931 (1909); Joyce v. Joyce, 10 Md. App. 516, 517, 276
A.2d 692, 693 (1970); 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 182 (1922); Greene,
Comparison of the Property Aspects of the Community Property and Common Law
Marital Property Systems and Their Relative Compatability with the Current View
of the Marriage Relationship and the Rights of Women, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 71,
76 (1979) [hereinafter cited as GREENE]; Note, The Distribution of Marital Real
Property Upon Divorce in West Virginia: The Needfor Legislative Reform, 82 W.
VA. L. REV. 611 (1980).
8. Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 462, 163 P. 76, 77 (1917); Joyce v. Joyce, 10
Md. App. 516, 517, 276 A.2d 692, 693 (1970); Kerner v. McDonald, 60 Neb. 663,
669, 84 N.W. 92, 92 (1900); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Co., 331 Pa.
476, 487-88, 200 A. 624, 628 (1938); I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 1.1 (1973).
9. See sources cited supra note 8.
10. Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 463, 163 P. 76, 77 (1917); Mittel v. Karl, 133
Ill. 65, 67, 24 N.E. 553, 554 (1890); Joyce v. Joyce, 10 Md. App. 516, 519-20, 276
A.2d 692, 695 (1970); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings and Trust Co., 331 Pa. 476,
488, 200 A. 624, 628 (1938); Van Ausdal v. Van Ausdall, 48 R.I. 106, 110, 135 A.
850, 852 (1927); I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 2.2 (1973); W. DEFUNIAK &
M. VAUGN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 5 n.5 (2d ed. 1971); Greene,
supra note 7, at 71.
11. Whyman v. Johnston, 62 Colo. 461, 462-63, 163 P. 76, 77 (1917); Arrand v. Gra-
ham, 297 Mich. 559, 298 N.W. 281 (1941); In re Hackett, 104 Pa. Super. 18, 63
A.2d 477, 479 (1949); I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 2.3 (1973); Greene, supra
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husband was awarded most, if not all, of the marital property.'
2
Five states: Florida, Mississippi, South Carolina, Virginia, and
West Virginia apply the strictest interpretation of the common law.'
3
However, the husband is no longer presumed to own all property ac-
quired during the marriage. Rather, title to property remains the deter-
minative factor in the allocation of marital assets. 4 If property is titled
in only one name it will be awarded to that spouse, the court being
without authority to divest spouses of their separate property.'5
Where strict common law states have enacted statutes allowing the
award of alimony and dower, most other jurisdictions have gone much
further in modifying the common law system by statutorily providing
for the equitable distribution of marital property upon divorce. 6 Equi-
note 7, at 79; Haskins, The Estate By the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 345,
352-53 (1949).
12. Dura Seal Products Co. v. Carver, 186 Pa. Super. 425, 429, 140 A.2d 844, 846
(1958); Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 715 (W.Va. 1981); Wood v. Wood,
126 W.Va. 189, 193, 28 S.E.2d 423, 425 (1943); see also Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J.
196, 213, 320 A.2d 484, 493 (1974) (before enactment of a statute specifying other-
wise, the court was limited to permitting payment of alimony and maintenance to
the wife); Jennings v. Connecticut, 194 Or. 686, 690, 243 P.2d 1080, 1081-82 (1952)
(the presumption that assistance from a wife is gratuitous is a rationale one, other-
wise "titles to real property would be greatly disturbed and made uncertain");
Perlberger, Marital Property Distribution: Legal and Emotional Considerations, 25
VILL. L. REV. 662, 668 (1980).
13. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-08 (West Supp. 1982); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp.
1979); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-3-120 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1980); VA. CODE § 20-111
(Supp. 1981); W.VA. CODE §§ 48-2-16, 48-2-21 (1976).
However, Florida and South Carolina have recognized the conferment of
lump sum alimony. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61-08 (West Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-130 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 1980); see Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382
So.2d 1197, 1200-01 (Fla. 1980); Neff v. Neff, 386 So.2d 318, 319 (Fla. 1980); Sim-
mons v. Simmons, 275 S.C. 41, 42, 267 S.E.2d 427, 428 (1980). In addition, the
state legislatures of Florida and South Carolina give the wife a special equity in
the property which she contributed to the acquisition of during coverture. See
Blum v. Blum, 382 So.2d 52, 55 (Fla. 1980); Powers v. Powers, 273 S.C. 51, 55, 254
S.E.2d 289, 291 (1979); Wilson v. Wilson, 270 S.C. 216, 221-22, 241 S.E.2d 566,
568 (1978). Hence, they can be likened to equitable jurisdiction states.
14. Patterson v. Patterson, 277 S.E.2d 709, 711 (W. Va. 1981); Pierce v. Pierce, 274
S.E.2d 514, 515 (W.Va. 1981); Note, The Distribution of Marital Real Property
Upon Divorce in West Virginia: The Needfor Legislative Reform, 82 W.VA. L.
REV. 611, 612 (1980); see Wray v. Langston, 380 So.2d 1262, 1263 (Miss. 1980);
Bond v. Bond, 355 So.2d 672, 673 (Miss. 1978).
15. See authorities cited supra note 12.
16. Eg., ALASKA STAT. § 09-55.210(6) (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1214 (Supp.
1981); COLO REV. STAT. § 14-10-113 (Supp. 1980); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46b-81 (West Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN.. tit. 13, § 1513 (Supp. 1980); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16.910 (1981); HAWAii REV. STAT. § 580-47 (Supp. 1979); ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 40, § 503 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1981-82); IND. CODE ANN. § 3 1-1-
11.5-11 (Bums 1980); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.21 (West Supp. 1981-82); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610(c) (Supp. 1980); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (Baldwin
1979); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 722-A (1964); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE
ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1980); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 552-19 (Supp. 1981-82);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.58 (West Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330
(Vernon Supp. 1981); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 40-4-202 (1979); NEB. REV.
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table distribution jurisdictions recognize that both spouses contribute
their best efforts to the marriage, its undertakings and acquisitions in
such a way as to maximize the financial benefits to the marital relation-
ship. 7 Based on this premise the courts in these jurisdictions apportion
the marital assets in what they determine to be the most just and equi-
table manner. 8 Although the factors to be considered may be statu-
torily enumerated, 9 the courts invariably retain extremely broad
discretion in the actual division of marital property.2 ° It should be
noted that equitable distribution is not equivalent to equal distribution,
rather the appropriate allocation depends upon the specific facts and
STAT. § 42-365 (1978); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. XLIII, ch. 458:19 (Supp. 1981);
N.J. STAT ANN. § 2A:34-23 (West Supp. 1981-82); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 236B
(McKimney Supp. 1980-81); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1971); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 12, § 1278 (West Supp. 1980-8 1); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(e) (1979-80);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 401 (Purdon Supp. 1981-82); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16.1
(Supp. 1980); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 25-4-44 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-
8216 (Supp. 1981); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
15, § 751 (Supp. 1979); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 767-255 (West Supp. 1981); Wyo.
STAT. § 20-2-114 (1977); see also Carter v. Carter, 419 A.2d 1018, 1023 (Me. 1980)
(marital property is all property acquired subsequent to the marriage and prior to
a decree of legal separation); Melamed v. Melamed, 286 N.W.2d 716, 717 (Minn.
1979) (same); Halla v. Halla, 200 N.W.2d 271, 275 (N.D. 1972) (same); Barbou v.
Barbou, 518 P.2d 12, 15 (Wyo. 1974) (same).
Separate property is generally stipulated as that property acquired prior to
the marriage, or by gift, bequest, devise, descent, or acquired after a decree of
legal separation or excluded by valid agreement of the parties. See, e.g., COLO.
REV. STAT. § 14-10-113(2)(a) to (2)(d) (Supp. 1980); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§ 722-A (1964); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452-330.2 (Vernon 1979); N.Y. DoM. REL.
LAW § 236B(l)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
17. Harper v. Harper, 49 Md. App. 339, 346, 431 A.2d 761, 764 (1981); DiFlorido v.
DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 650-51, 331 A.2d 174, 179 (1975); see Painter v. Painter, 65
N.J. 196, 211-12, 320 A.2d 484, 492 (1974); Perlberger, Marital Property Distribu-
tion.: Legal and Emotional Considerations, 25 VILL. L. REV. 662, 670 (1980); Note,
The Distribution of Marital Real Property Upon Divorce in West Virginia.- The Need
for Legislative Reform, 82 W. VA. L. REV. 611, 613 (1980).
18. See Harper v. Harper, 49 Md. App. 339, 343-44, 431 A.2d 761, 763 (1981) (dis-
cusses what is just and equitable); Anderson v. Anderson, 584 S.W.2d 613, 615
(Mo. 1979) (same); Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 211-12, 215, 320 A.2d 484, 492,
494 (1974) (same).
19. In a recent Maryland decision the court of special appeals acknowledged that
those factors set out in MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-6A-05 (1980)
included the contributions, both monetary and nonmonetary, made by each party
to the well-being of the family, the value of the property interests of each spouse,
the circumstances contributing to the estrangement of the parties, the duration of
the marriage, and how and when the specific marital property was acquired. Tak-
ing these factors into consideration, the court found that although the husband
provided the bulk of the financial contributions toward acquiring the family
house the wife, as wife and mother for twenty-nine years, had made substantial
nonmonetary contributions toward the marriage and family during the time the
home was acquired. Therefore, the court held the home to be marital property
awarding a one-half interest to each spouse. Harper v. Harper, 49 Md. App. 339,
346, 431 A.2d 761, 763 (1981).
20. See Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196, 320 A.2d 484 (1974); Halla v. Halla, 200
N.W.2d 271 (N.D. 1972); DiFlorido v. DiFlorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174
(1975).
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circumstances of each case.2 '
In contrast, the doctrine of community property, originating from
Spanish law, 22 is based upon the concept of equality between spouses.
It concentrates on when and how the marital property was acquired,
rather than who acquired it, in determining its distribution upon di-
vorce. 23 Unlike the equitable distribution theory, a spouse does not
have a mere expectancy but an absolute ownership of half of the com-
munity property.24 Presently this system is adopted in eight American
states. 25 Within these states, community property, broadly defined as
that property acquired during the marriage and not constituting sepa-
rate property, is divided equitably upon divorce.26 Separate property is
comprised of those assets acquired by one spouse before or after mar-
riage, by gift, bequest, or inheritance and is distributed accordingly.27
21. Collett v. Collett, 621 P.2d 1093, 1096 (Mont. 1981); Halla v. Halla, 200 N.W.2d
271, 275 (N.D. 1972); Johnson v. Johnson, 300 N.W.2d 865, 868 (S.D. 1980);
Barbou v. Barbou, 518 P.2d 12, 16 (Wyo. 1974).
22. Packard v. Arellanes, 17 Cal. 525 (1861); Saul and His Creditors, 5 Martin (n.s.)
569, 16 Am. Dec. 212 (La. 1827); Nixon v. Brown, 46 Nev. 439, 214 P. 524 (1923);
McDonald v. Sem, 53 N.M. 198, 204 P.2d 990 (1949).
23. In re Bjornestad's Marriage, 38 Cal. 3d 801, 806, 113 Cal. Rptr. 576, 579 (1974);
Bowman v. Bowman, 72 Idaho 266, 270, 240 P.2d 487, 489 (1952); Smoot v.
Smoot, 568 S.W.2d 177, 180 (Tex. 1978); Rustad v. Rustad, 61 Wash. 2d 176, 179,
377 P.2d 414, 415 (1963); see Jurek v. Jurek, 129 Ariz. 596, 606 P.2d 812, 814
(1980) (damage claims for personal injuries are divisible when lost wages and
expenses are incurred during marriage); Patillo v. Norris, 65 Cal. 3d 209, 218, 135
Cal. Rptr. 210, 216 (1976) (insurance benefits held divisible); Michelson v. Mich-
elson, 89 N.M. 282, 287, 551 P.2d 638, 642-44 (1976) (ascertaining growth and
profits as separate property); In re Estate of Trierweiler, 5 Wash. App. 17, 24, 486
P.2d 314, 318 (197 1) (value of wife's labor held divisible as community property).
24. LaTourette v. LaTourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 208, 137 P. 426, 429 (1914); Phillips v.
Phillips, 160 La. 814, 826, 107 So. 584, 588 (1926); In re Chavez's Estate, 34 N.M.
258, 265, 280 P. 241, 243 (1929).
25. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110 (West Supp.
1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2334 (West
Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.030 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-2 (1978);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.16.030 (Supp. 1981).
26. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 580, 578 P.2d 1006, 1008 (1978); LaTourette v.
LaTourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 206, 137 P. 426, 428 (1914); Stranger v. Stranger, 98
Idaho 725, 727, 571 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1977); Moore v. Moore, 71 N.M. 495, 499,
379 P.2d 784, 787 (1963); Contreras v. Contreras, 590 S.W.2d 218, 220-21 (Tex.
1979); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5110
(West Supp. 1981); IDAHO CODE § 32-906 (Supp. 1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2338 (West Supp. 1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 40-3-8(B) (1978); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(b) (Vernon 1975); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1981). See generally Hughes v. Hughes, 91
N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194, 1199 (1978) (explaining the differences between com-
mon law right to marital property and community property right to marital prop-
erty); W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1, at
1 (2d ed. 1971).
27. Flowers v. Flowers, 118 Ariz. 577, 579, 578 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1978); Stranger v.
Stranger, 98 Idaho 725, 727, 571 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1977); Stephens v. Stephens, 93
N.M. 1, 2-3, 595 P.2d 1196, 1197-98 (1974); see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-
218 (1976); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 5107 (wife), 5108 (husband) (West Supp. 1981);
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A rebuttable presumption exists that all property acquired during the
marriage belongs to the community. 28 The party asserting the separate
nature of the property has the burden of overcoming that presumption
by tracing the property to a separate source.29 Once its status has been
determined, the courts exercise wide discretion in equitably distributing
the community property." Although California 3' and New Mexico
32
are the only community property states statutorily requiring equal divi-
sion, most other states voluntarily apportion the property in a substan-
tially equal manner.33
B. Distribution of Private Pensions Upon Divorce
No general rule exists as to the distribution of private pension
rights upon divorce. Jurisdictions differ, taking into account such fac-
tors as whether the employee had contributed into the pension during
the marriage34 and whether the pension had vested prior to divorce.
35
IDAHO CODE § 32-903 (Supp. 1981); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2341 (West Supp.
1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.130 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-8(A) (1978);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.01(a) (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 26.16.010 to .020 (Supp. 1981).
28. Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 917, 544 P.2d 956, 964, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828
(1976); Stranger v. Stranger, 98 Idaho 725, 727, 571 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1977); Bow-
man v. Bowman, 72 Idaho 266, 268, 240 P.2d 487, 488 (1952); see also LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2340 (West Supp. 1981) (statutory presumption of community
property); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.230 (1979) (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12
(1978) (same); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 5.02 (Vernon 1975) (same).
29. Estate of Murphy, 15 Cal. 3d 907, 917, 544 P.2d 956, 964, 126 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828
(1976); Stranger v. Stranger, 98 Idaho 725, 728, 571 P.2d 1126, 1128 (1977); Con-
treras v. Contreras, 590 S.W.2d 218, 221 (Tex. 1979); see Matter of Messer, 118
Ariz. 291, 293, 576 P.2d 150, 152 (1978) (failure to rebut presumption will lead the
court to conclude that property is community).
30. Guy v. Guy, 98 Idaho 205, 208-09, 560 P.2d 876, 879 (1977); Murffv. Murff, 615
S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); Campbell v. Campbell, 586 S.W.2d 162, 166, 169
(Tex. 1979); In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wash. 2d 649, 656, 565 P.2d 790, 794
(1977); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-318 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 32-712(1) (Supp.
1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.150 (1979); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 363 (Vernon 1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.080
(Supp. 1981); W. DEFUNIAK & M. VAUGN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROP-
ERTY § 227, at 514 (2d ed. 1971); Greene, supra note 7, at 97.
31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4800 (West Supp. 1981).
32. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-7 (1978); see Ridgway v. Ridgway, 94 N.M. 345, 610
P.2d 749, 750 (1980).
33. Nace v. Nace, 6 Ariz. App. 348, 353, 432 P.2d 896, 901 (1967); Guy v. Guy, 98
Idaho 205, 209, 560 P.2d 876, 880 (1977); Shepard v. Shepard, 94 Idaho 734, 735,
497 P.2d 321, 322 (1972). But see LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2406 (West Supp.
1981) (statute requiring the equal division of community property repealed Jan. 1,
1980).
34. See In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975) (husband's
contribution on deposit with the Public Employee's Retirement Association con-
stituted marital property); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d
272 (1977) (husband's interest in Public Safety Department Pension was created
in most part from his salary and therefore is marital property).
35. Compare Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 248 N.W.2d 272 (1977) (pen-
sion found divisible was fully vested and could not be subjected to divestment or
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A pension is vested when a sufficient amount of requirements have
been fulfilled so as to render the rights to the fund irrevocable. 36 Matu-
ration of a pension right, in contrast to vesting, grants an individual an
unconditional and immediate right to payment. 37 For example, if a
retirement program is based upon a point system, an employee may
accrue enough points to hold a vested interest in his pension, yet his
right may not mature until he reaches a certain designated retirement
age and elects to retire.38 A contributory pension plan is funded, at
least in part, by deductions from employee's salaries, while a noncon-
tributory plan is funded solely by the employer.39
In common law property states, pensions are not distributed upon
divorce since they are held in only one person's name; however, they
are taken into consideration to determine a proper award of alimony.4"
To the contrary, equitable distribution jurisdictions view a vested pen-
sion as marital property.4 In a contributory pension plan, in which the
pension has been funded through accumulated deductions from one
spouse's earnings during the marital relationship, courts justify divid-
ing the pension by noting that, absent such deductions, the couple
probably would have used the earnings in another manner.42 In the
case of a noncontributory pension plan, the divisibility is dependent
forfeiture) with Murphy v. Murphy, 613 S.W.2d 450 (Mo. App. 1981) (nonvested
pension plan value considered de minimus and too speculative to be considered as
marital property requiring disposition).
36. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 635 (1976); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451,
111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1974); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 I11. App. 3d 653, 658,
397 N.E.2d 511, 515 (1979); Frank v. Day's Inc., 13 Wash. App. 401,405, 535 P.2d
479, 482 (1975); Solomon, Beyond Preemptiorn Accomodation of the Nonemployee
Spouse's Interest Under ERISA, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1021, 1024 (May, 1980).
37. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 842, 544 P.2d 561, 563, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 635 (1976); In re Marriage of Fithian, 10 Cal. 3d 592, 596, 517 P.2d 449, 451,
111 Cal. Rptr. 369, 371 (1974); In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 II. App. 3d 653, 658,
397 N.E.2d 511, 515 (1979).
38. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 841-43, 544 P.2d 561, 562-63, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976); see Frank v. Day's Inc., 1-3 Wash. App. 401, 405, 535
P.2d 479, 482 (1975) (though entitled to only 45% of his credits, an employee who
terminates his employment after 10 years does have a fully vested right to that
percentage and the employer is bound to pay it after the right to payment
matures).
39. In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 544 P.2d 639 (1975); In re Marriage of
Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979).
40. See Beechan v. Beechan, 407 So.2d 237, 238 (Fla. 1981) (no pension was awarded,
yet the court let stand the lower court's consideration of the pension in setting the
wife's alimony).
41. In re Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 402-03, 574 P.2d 613, 616 (1978); Hus-
band B. v. Wife B., 396 A.2d 169, 172 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Tavares v. Tavares,
58 Hawaii 541, 544, 574 P.2d 125, 127 (1978); In re Marriage of Bodford, 94 Ill.
App. 3d 91, 92, 418 N.E.2d 487, 488 (1981); Hutchins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App.
361, 371, 248 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1977); Jensen v. Jensen, 276 N.W.2d 68, 69 (Minn.
1979).
42. In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 239, 544 P.2d 639, 640 (1975); Hutch-
ins v. Hutchins, 71 Mich. App. 361, 371, 248 N.W.2d 272, 277 (1977); see In re
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upon whether a spouse earned the pension during consortium, regard-
less of the fact that no funds were actually diverted from the marital
community.43
Although most courts in equitable distribution jurisdictions hold
that nonvested pension interests are mere expectancies and, hence, too
speculative to be considered marital property,44 a number of recent
cases appear to be moving away from that position.45 These courts
place greater emphasis on whether the rights or benefits to the pension
were acquired during the marriage, regardless of whether that right had
vested.46 Reasoning that the efforts of both parties contribute to the
marriage, spouses are viewed as holding identical expectations of fu-
ture enjoyment and security from the pension.47
In the recent case of Deering v. Deering,48 the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reviewed this current trend and dismissed vesting as the
determinative of whether a pension should be considered marital
property.49 The court held that pension benefits represent a form of
deferred compensation, constituting marital property to the extent that
they are accumulated during the marriage.50
Various methods are utilized by the courts in allocating retirement
benefits upon divorce. Often, the value of pensions is included with
other marital assets and then equitably distributed with the marital
property as a whole.51 However, an increasing number of states have
begun to separately apportion the pension fund itself.52 The Deering
court summarized three alternative methods for dividing the pension:
First, the trial court could consider the amount of [the
husband's] contribution to the fund, plus interest, and award
Marriage of Smith, 84 Ill. App. 3d 446, 454, 405 N.E.2d 884, 890 (1980) (military
disability pay).
43. In re Marriage of Bodford, 94 Ill. App. 3d 91, 418 N.E.2d 487 (1981); In re Marr-
riage of Hunt, 78 Il. App. 3d 653, 397 N.E.2d 511 (1979); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 177
N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76 (1981).
44. In re Marriage of Pope, 37 Colo. App. 237, 239, 544 P.2d 639, 640 (1975); Savage
v. Savage, 374 N.E.2d 536, 539 (Ind. 1978); Murphy v. Murphy, 613 S.W.2d 450,
452 (Mo. App. 1981).
45. E.g., In re Marriage of Bodford, 94 Ill. App. 3d 91, 93, 418 N.E.2d 487, 489 (1981);
In re Marriage of Hunt, 78 Ill. App. 3d 653, 662, 397 N.E.2d 511, 518 (1979);
Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 128, 437 A.2d 883, 890 (1981); Bloomer v.
Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 130, 267 N.W.2d 235, 238 (1978).
46. See cases cited supra note 42.
47. See cases cited supra note 45.
48. 292 Md. 115, 437 A.2d 883 (1981).
49. Id at 128, 437 A.2d at 890.
50. Id
51. See cases cited supra note 42.
52. Husband B. v. Wife B., 396 A.2d 169, 172 (Del. Super. Ct. 1978); Pollick v. Pol-
lick, 52 Hawaii 357, 364, 477 P.2d 620, 640 (1970); In re Marriage of Bodford, 94
Ill. App. 3d 91, 92, 418 N.E.2d 487, 488 (1981); Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115,
129, 437 A.2d 883, 891 (1981); Martinez v. Martinez, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2781,
2782 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 13, 1981).
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[the wife] an appropriate share. . . . Second, the trial court
could attempt to calculate the present value of [the husband's]
retirement benefits when they vest under the plan. Under this
approach, the benefits payable in the future would have to be
discounted for interest m the future, for mortality. . . and for
vesting. . . . The benefits would then have to be calculated
with respect to [the husband's] life expectancy as a retiree
Under either of the above two methods, the trial court
would have the discretion to order the payment to [the wife]
of her share in either a lump sum or in installments, depend-
ing primarily on the other assets and relative financial posi-
tions of the parties. The third method. . . is to determine a
fixed percentage for [the wife] of any future payments [the
husband] receives under the plan, payable to her as if, and
when paid to [the husband]. . . . Under this approach...
[t]he court need do no more than determine the appropriate
percentage to which the non-employee spouse is entitled. 3
In addition, the court in Deering cautioned that the method chosen to
divide pensions should be made in light of the individual circumstances
of the case. °
A majority of community property jurisdictions conclude that
both vested and nonvested private pension benefits represent a form of
deferred compensation and, as such, represent a property interest." To
the extent that this interest accrued during coverture it constitutes com-
munity property subject to division upon divorce. 6
In re Marriage of Brown57 is the leading community property case
addressing the division of pension benefits upon divorce. In that case,
Brown participated in a noncontributory pension plan based on an age
and years-of-service point system. Brown and his wife separated after
he had acquired seventy-two of the required seventy-eight points. 8
Overruling all prior inconsistent holdings, the court held that pension
53. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 130-31, 437 A.2d 883, 891 (1981) (citing
Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235, 241 (1978)).
54. Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 133, 437 A.2d 883, 892 (1981).
55. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 852, 544 P.2d 561, 570, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 642 (1976); Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, 436, 599 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1979);
Copeland v. Copeland, 91 N.M. 409, 575 P.2d 99, 102 (1978); Ellett v. Ellett, 94
Nev. 34, 37, 573 P.2d 1179, 1181 (1978); Murffv. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 700 (Tex.
1981); DeRevere v. DeRevere, 5 Wash. App. 741, 743, 491 P.2d 249, 252 (1971);
see also W. DEFUNLAK & M. VAUGN, PRINCIPALS OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY,
§ 233, at 259 (2d ed. 1971); cf. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 273, 569 P.2d
214, 216 (1977) (military retirement pay divisible upon divorce).
56. In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 856, 544 P.2d 561, 564, 126 Cal. Rptr.
633, 641 (1976); Shill v. Shill, 100 Idaho 433, 436, 599 P.2d 1004, 1007 (1979);
Ellett v. Ellett, 94 Nev. 34, 37, 573 P.2d 1179, 1181 (1978); DeRevere v. DeRevere,
5 Wash. App. 741, 743, 491 P.2d 249, 252 (1971).
57. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
58. Id at 842-43, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
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benefits were a form of deferred compensation and that nonvested pen-
sion benefits should be considered community property. 9 The court
recognized that pension rights are often the most valuable asset of the
marital community and that the required equal division of community
property would be impossible if the entire pension were awarded to one
spouse alone.6 ° In response to the argument that any inequities created
under prior law could be redressed by the award of alimony, the court
remarked, "[tihe spouse should not be dependent on the discretion of
the court. . . to provide her with the equivalent of what should be hers
as a matter of absolute right." 61 Moreover, the court stated:
[T]he joint effort that composes the community and the
respective contributions of the spouses that make up its assets
are the meaningful criteria. The wife's contribution to the
community is not one whit less [sic] if we declare the hus-
band's pension rights not a contingent asset but a mere
"'expectancy."
Fortunately we can appropriately reflect the realistic situ-
ation by recognizing that the husband's pension rights, a. con-
tingent interest, whether vested or not vested, comprise a
property interest of the community and that the wife may
properly share in it.62
Until recently, because of the distinctive features of military retirement
pay, courts in both community property and common law jurisdictions
varied as to whether such benefits were similar to private pensions.
C Military Retirement Pay
1. Generally
Unlike most private pension plans, military retirement pay is non-
contributory.63 It is funded by annual appropriations 64 provided by
59. Id at 851, 544 P.2d at 569, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641.
60. Id at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
61. Id at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
62. Id at 851-52, 544 P.2d at 569-70, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 641-42.
63. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 215 (1981); Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp.
866, 868 (D.N.C. 1976); In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 851-52, 544 P.2d
561, 569-70, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 641-42 (1976); Preliminary Review of Military Re-
tirement Systems, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Military Compensation of the
House Comm. on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 7 (1977-78) (testi-
mony of Col. Leon S. Hirsh, Jr.) [hereinafter cited as Military Retirement Sys-
tems]; Hearings on H.R. 2817, HR. 3677 & H.R. 6270, Legislation Related to
Benefts/or Former Spouse of a Military Retiree Before the Military Compensation
Subcomm ofthe Comm on Armed Services, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1980) (state-
ment of C.A. "Mack" McKinney, Sergeant Major, USMC Retired, Senior V.P.
for Gov't Affairs, Non-Commissioned Officers Ass'n) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings].
64. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 214 (1981); Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp.
866, 869 (D.N.C. 1976).
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Congress and administered by the Department of Defense. 65 Vesting
does not occur until the member has served for a minimum prescribed
period, currently twenty years.66 Military retirement pay commences at
the time of retirement, with the amount calculated on a percentage of
active duty basic pay.67 If a member terminates his68 service before
twenty years, the entitlement to retirement pay is forfeited.69
A military retiree remains, in effect, a member of the armed
forces.7° The retiree is subject to recall to active duty71 and continues
to be governed by the Uniform Code of Military Justice.72 Continua-
tion of military retirement pay may be affected by the retiree's subse-
65. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571, 577 (1934); Frisbee v. United States, 157
U.S. 160, 166 (1895); United States v. Teller, 107 U.S. 64, 68 (1882); Gordon v.
United States, 140 F. Supp. 263, 264 (1956).
66. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 214 (1981); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571, 577 (1934); Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D.N.C. 1976); In re
Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 403, 574 P.2d 613, 617 (1978); 10 U.S.C.
§ 3911 (1976) (an army officer who has served for twenty years, at least ten in
active service as a commissioned officer, may request the Secretary of the Army to
retire him); see also 10 U.S.C. § 3917 (1976) (an enlisted member of the Army
may be retired upon request after thirty years of service).
67. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 214 n. 7 (1981); Military Retirement Systems,
supra note 63, at 6 (testimony of Col. Leon S. Hirsh, Jr.); SUBCOMM. ON RETIRE-
MENT INCOME AND EMPLOYMENT, HOUSE SELECT COMM. ON AGING, WOMEN
AND RETIREMENT INCOME PROGRAMS, 96TH CONG., IST SESS., CURRENT ISSUES
OF EQUITY AND ADEQUACY 15 (Comm. Print No. 96-190 (1979)) [hereinafter
cited as WOMEN AND RETIREMENT]. 75% of basic pay is the maximum amount
permitted to calculate military retirement pay, regardless of the number of years
of actual service. 75% would be obtained upon the completion of thirty years of
service. Military Retirement Systems, supra note 63, at 6 (testimony of Col. Leon
S. Hirsh, Jr.); WOMEN AND RETIREMENT, supra, at 7.
68. The masculine pronoun is generally recognized as proper grammatical usage. In
addition, the term "serviceman" is used throughout this comment solely for stylis-
tic reasons. The author fully recognizes that the male and female roles, in this
circumstance, are interchangeable.
69. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 214 (1981); Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571, 577 (1934); Watson v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D.N.C. 1976); In re
Marriage of Mitchell, 195 Colo. 399, 403, 574 P.2d 613, 617 (1978); Military Retire-
ment Systems, supra note 63, at 27 (testimony of Col. Leon S. Hirsh, Jr.); Hearings,
supra note 63, at 97 (statement of C.A. "Mack" McKinney, Sergeant Major,
USMC Retired, Senior V.P. for Gov't Affairs, Non-Commissioned Officers
Ass'n).
70. Puglisi v. United States, 564 F.2d 403, 410 (1977); Hotinsky v. United States, 292
F.2d 508, 510 (1961); Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248, 249 (1948); 10
U.S.C. §§ 3503, 3504 (1976); Hearings, supra note 63, at 97 (1980) (statement of
C.A. "Mack" McKinney, Sergeant Major, USMC Retired, Senior V.P. for Gov't
Affairs, Non-Commissioned Officers Ass'n).
71. Puglisi v. United States, 564 F.2d 403, 410 (1977); Hotinsky v. United States, 292
F.2d 508, 510 (1961); Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248, 249 (1948); 10
U.S.C. § 672(a) (1976).
72. Puglisi v. United States, 564 F.2d 403, 410 (1977); Hotinsky v. United States, 292
F.2d 508, 510 (1961); Lemly v. United States, 75 F. Supp. 248, 249 (1948); Watson
v. Watson, 424 F. Supp. 866, 868 (D.N.C. 1976); 10 U.S.C. § 1482 (1976); Hear-
ings, supra note 63, at 99 (written statement of C.A. "Mack" McKinney, Sergeant
Major, USMC Retired, Senior V.P. for Gov't Affairs, Non-Commissioned Of-
ficers Ass'n).
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quent employment73 or forfeited upon conviction of certain crimes. 4
Although military retirement pay terminates at death, a portion of the
member's retirement pay can be automatically set aside for his survi-
vors. 75 Under the Survivor Benefit Plan the service member is free to
designate someone other than his spouse or ex-spouse as a
beneficiary.76
2. Division Upon Divorce Prior to McCarty
a. Common Law and Equitable Distribution States
Prior to McCarty, some noncommunity property jurisdictions con-
sidered military retirement pay to be separate property, not subject to
division upon the dissolution of marriage.17  Others refused to dis-
tribute the benefits to the nonmilitary spouse, finding the issue feder-
ally preempted.78 The remainder divided military retirement pay upon
divorce as marital property.79
The jurisdictions holding military retirement pay nondivisible
upon divorce followed the rationale proffered in In re Marriage of El-
lis. 80 In that Colorado case, even though the husband's right to mili-
tary retirement pay had vested prior to his divorce, the court declined
to distribute the benefits between the spouses. The court gave great
weight to the fact that a member's right to payment did not generally
vest until a full twenty years had been served.8' In addition, the court
considered a member's subjectibility to active recall and the tax impli-
cations of distributing the benefits.82 Furthermore, the court placed
significant emphasis on the lack of cash surrender, loan, redemption or
lump sum value of military retirement pay.83 Thus, military retirement
73. Retired members are prevented from being employed by any foreign government.
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 8. Moreover, retirement pay is subject to reduction
upon any further employment. 5 U.S.C. § 5532 (1976).
74. 5 U.S.C. § 8312 (1976).
75. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 215 (1981); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455 (1976);
Women and Retirement, supra note 67, at 17, 68.
76. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 215 (1981); 10 U.S.C. § 2771(d) (1976).
77. See, e.g., Fenney v. Fenney, 537 S.W.2d 367 (Ark. 1976); Hill v. Hill, 47 Md. App.
460, 424 A.2d 779 (1981); Baker v. Baker, 421 A.2d 998 (N.H. 1980); Baker v.
Baker, 546 P.2d 1325 (Okla. 1975).
78. See, e.g., Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979); Russell v. Russell, 605
S.W.2d 33 (Ky. 1980).
79. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Musser, 70 Ill. App. 2d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979); In
re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d 421 (Iowa 1980); Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82
Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978); In re Marriage of Miller, 609 P.2d 1185
(Mont. 1980), judgment vacated and case remandedforfurther consideration in light
of McCarty, 453 U.S. 918 (1982); Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d
340 (1976), aff'd, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977).
80. 36 Colo. App. 234, 538 P.2d 1347 (1975), afl'd, 91 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976).
81. 36 Colo. App. at 235, 538 P.2d at 1349.
82. Military retirement pay is considered taxable income under the Internal Revenue
Code. I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (1976); see 26 U.S.C. § 61(a)(1 1) (Supp. IV 1980).
83. In re Marriage of Ellis, 36 Colo. App. 234, 236, 538 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1975), aft'd,
91 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976).
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pay was deemed continuing compensation for active duty performed
on a reduced basis, nondivisible as a property right upon the dissolu-
tion of a marriage.8 4 However, the court held that military retirement
pay, as post-divorce income, could be considered in awarding mainte-
nance and child support.85
A small minority of states avoided the issue of whether to classify
military retirement pay as a divisible property right by holding the
matter to be federally preempted. 6 The courts relied upon the
Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo87 where it was
held that a state court order dividing railroad retirement pay upon di-
vorce would contravene the intent of Congress.88 Applying this deci-
sion to military retirement pay, these courts found that Congress'
failure to provide for a divorced spouse in the annuity plan for military
retired members, coupled with the abolishment of a divorced spouse's
beneficiary status, demonstrated Congress' express intent to preempt
traditional state division of military retirement pay.8 9
The third group of states held military retirement pay to be marital
property divisible upon divorce.' For example, in Kruger v. Kruger, 9'
the New Jersey Superior Court held that military retirement pay, al-
though noncontributory, constitutes an integral part of the compen-
sation for military service previously rendered by the retiree.92
Accordingly, in the court's opinion, once the retirement pay became
irrevocable, it constituted assets subject to equitable distribution to the
extent that military service had been rendered during the pendency of
the marriage.93
b. Community Property Jurisdictions
Prior to McCarty, community property states generally94 held that
84. 36 Colo. App. at 236-37, 538 P.2d at 1349.
85. Id at 238, 538 P.2d at 1350.
86. Eg., Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230 (Alaska 1979); Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33
(Ky. 1980).
87. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
88. Id at 590.
89. Cose v. Cose, 592 P.2d 1230, 1232 (Alaska 1979); Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d
33, 36 (Ky. 1980). See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1447-1455 (1976).
90. Eg., Linson v. Linson, 618 P.2d 748 (Hawaii 1981); In re Marriage of Musser, 70
Ill. App. 2d 706, 388 N.E.2d 1289 (1979); In re Marriage of Schissel, 292 N.W.2d
421 (Iowa 1980); Chisnell v. Chisnell, 82 Mich. App. 699, 267 N.W.2d 155 (1978);
Kruger v. Kruger, 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976), af'd, 73 N.J. 464, 375
A.2d 659 (1977); Overman v. Overman, 570 S.W.2d 857 (Tenn. 1978).
91. 139 N.J. Super. 413, 354 A.2d 340 (1976), aft'd, 73 N.J. 464, 375 A.2d 659 (1977).
92. 139 N.J. Super. at 420, 354 A.2d at 344.
93. Id
94. Louisiana had previously ruled in accordance with the seven other community
property states. Swope v. Mitchell, 324 So.2d 461 (La. 1975). However, in light of
the Supreme Court case, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979), Louisi-
ana recently ruled that military retirement pay is preempted from the purview of
state divorce actions. DeDon v. DeDon, 390 So.2d 937 (La. App. 1980).
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vested and nonvested military retirement pay constituted community
property divisible upon divorce.95 The rationale behind this practice is
illustrated in two California cases: In re Marriage of Brown9 6 and In re
Marriage of Fithian. 97
In deciding the divisibility of military retirement pay, courts have
consistently cited In re Marriage of Brown98 despite the fact that the
case involved a private pension. The court in Brown expressed the
view that marriage constitutes an equal partnership, each spouse's role
equally important in maintaining the marriage community. As a re-
suit, each spouse acquired a property interest in the pension at issue.
Furthermore, the court observed that a pension is often the most signif-
icant asset of the marital community.9 9 Relying on Brown, those courts
distributing military retirement pay also recognized that the constant
mobility of military life all but destroyed the nonmilitary spouse's abil-
ity to acquire a vested interest in a pension of her own." As a result,
the eventual economic security of military retirement pay was consist-
ently held to be a community property right divisible upon dissolution
of a marriage.' 0 '
The husband in In re Marriage of Fithian 102 contended that the
state court was federally preempted from dividing his military retire-
ment pay.10 3 Refuting this contention, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia noted that Congress had been silent on the issue of preemption and
held that the division of military retirement pay in a state divorce pro-
ceeding does not interfere with the congressional purpose of military
retirement pay." The benefits were intended, in the court's opinion,
solely to enhance morale and encourage military service, not to com-
pensate the retiree for further government responsibilities.0 5
III. McCARTY v McCARTY
A. The Decision
At the time the McCarty's nineteen year marriage dissolved, Rich-
ard McCarty had served approximately eighteen of the twenty years
95. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); LeClert v. LeClert, 453 P.2d 755 (N.M. 1976).
96. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
97. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
98. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).
99. Id. at 847, 544 P.2d at 566, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
100. See I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 11.2, at 35 (1973).
101. Van Loan v. Van Loan, 116 Ariz. 272, 569 P.2d 214 (1977); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 96
Idaho 672, 535 P.2d 53 (1975); LeClert v. LeClert, 453 P.2d 755 (N.M. 1976);
Clearly v. Clearly, 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); In re Marriage of Jacobs, 20
Wash. App. 272, 579 P.2d 1023 (1978).
102. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369 (1974).
103. Id at 593, 517 P.2d at 450, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
104. Id at 604, 517 P.2d at 457, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 377.
105. Id at 605, 517 P.2d at 456, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 376.
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required for retirement from the Army.' °6 The California Superior
Court ruled that his military retirement pay was divisible as quasi-com-
munity property10 7 and awarded an equal portion to his wife. 0 8 The
Court of Appeals of California affirmed the award, refusing to accept
the husband's contention that the issue was federally preempted.'0 9
In July, 1981 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Cali-
fornia court, concluding that military retirement pay is a personal enti-
tlement of the retired serviceman and not divisible upon divorce as
community property." 0 Furthermore, federal preemption was held to
preclude state divorce courts from ruling otherwise."' In reaching its
decision, the Supreme Court relied on the lack of statutory language
conferring on the retired member's spouse any personal right to retire-
ment pay." 2 The Court found it significant that a serviceman is statu-
torily free to determine whether, upon his death, an annuity should be
provided to his current spouse. 1 3 Therefore, the Court reasoned that
because one spouse cannot legally deprive the other of his rightful com-
munity property interest, Congress could not have intended military
retirement pay to be considered community property." 4
Recognizing that a "mere conflict in words"'"I5 is insufficient to
support a finding of federal preemption, the Supreme Court reviewed
Congress' objectives in providing for military retirement pay. The par-
amount goal was held to be the maintenance of a youthful and vigor-
ous military force." 6 Military retirement pay, in the Court's opinion,
was intended to accomplish this goal by encouraging enlistment and re-
enlistment while concurrently inducing retirement at a designated
age.' 1' The Court feared that once a person realized military retire-
ment pay would be divided upon divorce he would decide against en-
listing or, conversly, decide against retiring.'" The Court further
106. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 216 (1981).
107. CAL. CIv. CODE § 4803 (West Supp. 1981) (quasi-community property is that
property acquired by the spouse when domiciled elsewhere which would have
been deemed community property had it been acquired while the spouse was
domiciled in California).
108. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 211 (1981).
109. Id. at 218-19.
110. Id at 210-11.
111. Id
112. Id at 223-24. The Supreme Court cites a quote as support for its decision: "His-
torically, military retirement pay has been a personal entitlement payable to the
retired member himself so long as he lives." Id at 224 (emphasis added). It
should be noted that this quote was stated in the context of discussing survivor
plan arrearages, not military retirement pay per se. See S. REP. No. 1480, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3294, 3300.
113. 10 U.S.C. § 2771 (1976).
114. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 226, 232 (1981).
115. Id. at 232.
116. Id. at 234.
117. Id
118. Id
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feared that servicemen would be discouraged from setting aside por-
tions of their retirement pay as an annuity if an ex-spouse were permit-
ted a paramount interest to that of a widow and surviving children." 9
In conclusion, the Court stated that, as Congress had chosen not to
speak on this issue, 20 any conffict between community property rights
and the federal military retirement system was insufficient to outweigh
the threat of grave harm to clear and substantial federal interests.' 2' If
not preempted, the Court believed that states would divide military re-
tirement pay, frustrating what the Court considered clear congressional
objectives.122
B. Deviation from Precedent
Traditionally, questions relating to family relationships and prop-
erty law have been recognized as matters of state concern and were
consistently left to the authority of each individual jurisdiction absent
the clearest direction from Congress to the contrary. 23 In McCarty,
the Supreme Court deviated from precedent by interpreting the silence
of Congress as indicative of an intent to preempt states from determin-
ing the relative property rights of their citizens upon divorce.124
Only five previous Supreme Court decisions effectively preempted
state community property law. 125 Each of these cases involved specific
statutes containing clear statements of congressional intent. McCune v.
Essig 26 involved the Homestead Act where Congress had clearly
stated that a homesteader's widow was to receive the husband's interest
119. Id at 233.
120. Congress has passed legislation directing the recognition of community property
law when dealing with Civil Service retirement benefits, 5 U.S.C. § 8345(j)(1)
(1976 & Supp. 111978), and Foreign Service retirement benefits, 22 U.S.C. § 4054
(Supp. IV 1980). The Court interpreted Congressional inaction in the area of
military retirement pay as indicative of its personal nature. McCarty v. McCarty,
453 U.S. 210, 215 (1981).
121. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981).
122. Congressional power to rule on military retirement pay is granted through the
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 12-14(9). It includes the power "to raise and support
Armies," "to provide and maintain a Navy," and to make rules for the governing
and regulation of land and naval forces. Id
123. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 237 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Alessi
v. Raybestos Manhatten Inc., 450 U.S. 906, 911 (1981); United States v. Yazell,
382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); In re Burris, 136 U.S. 586, 594 (1890); Buechold v. Urtiz,
401 F.2d 371, 372 (9th Cir. 1968); Stone v. Stone, 450 F. Supp. 919, 921 (N.D. Cal.
1978); I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 11.2 (Supp. 1980); Reppy, Community
and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefits After Marriage of
Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417, 483 (1978); Note, The Federal Com-
mon Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1512 (1969).
124. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 236-38 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
125. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572 (1979); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306
(1964); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 388 U.S 655
(1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
126. 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
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in his land.'27 In Wissner v. Wissner 128 it was held that Congress had
spoken with "force and clarity" in the National Life Insurance Act of
1940,129 wherein a retired military member was given the right to desig-
nate the beneficiary of his insurance policy and these payments were
protected from creditors, levies, seizures or attachments under any legal
or equitable proceeding. 30 In both Yiatchos v. Yiatchos 3 ' and Free v.
Bland132 the statute at issue specifically stipulated that one co-owner of
United States Savings Bonds became the sole owner upon the other's
death. 133 In the most recent case, Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 134 the
Supreme Court held that sections of the Railroad Retirement Act
clearly conflicted with the community property laws of the state of
California. 135
The Supreme Court in McCarty relied heavily upon the His-
quierdo decision. Both McCarty and Hisquierdo involved the division
of retirement benefits upon divorce in community property jurisdic-
tions, and in both the Court expressed the fear that if retirement bene-
fits were to be reduced upon divorce then employees would prolong
employment in lieu of retiring.' 36 Although there are similarities, the
two cases can be distinguished based upon differences in the applicable
federal statutes. In Hisquierdo the Supreme Court established a test to
determine whether federal law preempted state autonomy in the area
of family law: "On the rare occasion where state family law has come
into conflict with the federal statute, this Court has limited review
under the Supremacy Clause to a determination of whether Congress
has positively required by direct enactment that state law be pre-
empted."' 37  Accordingly, throughout the Hisquierdo opinion, the
127. Id at 384.
128. 388 U.S. 655 (1950).
129. 38 U.S.C. § 802 (1976).
130. Wissner v. Wissner, 388 U.S. 655, 659 (1950).
131. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
132. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
133. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964) (concerned regulations found in 31
U.S.C. § 315.66 (1976)); Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962) (concerned regulations
found in 31 U.S.C. § 257(c)(a) (1976)).
134. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
135. Id at 581. The Railroad Retirement Act provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States, or of any state, ter-
ritory, or the District of Columbia, no annuity or supplemental annuity
shall be assignable or be subject to any tax or garnishment, attachment,
or other legal process under any circumstances whatsoever, nor shall the
payment thereof be anticipated ....
45 U.S.C. § 231(m) (1976). The Court also relied upon 45 U.S.C. § 231(d)(c)(3)
which reads in part, "[t]he entitlement of a spouse of an individual to an annuity
• . . shall end on the last day of the month preceding the month. . . the spouse
and the individual are absolutely divorced .... ." Id
136. Compare McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 235 (1981) (fear expressed in regard
to military retirees) with Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 585 (1979) (fear
expressed in regard to railroad retirees).
137. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
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Court repeatedly stressed that its holding was based upon the clear and
deliberate intent of Congress as enunciated in the Railroad Retirement
Act.'38 This test directly followed precedent, 139 yet in McCarty, the
Supreme Court could find no similar direct expression of legislative
purpose in the legislation concerning military retirement pay. Conse-
quently, the Court resorted to an interpretation of legislative history to
reach the conclusion that Congress intended military retirement pay to
be a personal entitlement.14° However, the term "personal entitle-
ment" was found in a congressional discussion on specific military an-
nuity plans, not on the overall military retirement pay'system.' 4 1 It is,
therefore, questionable whether the Court's conclusion was "positively
required by direct enactment" so as to justify preempting the states'
normal autonomy in the domestic relations of their citizens.
C Effect of McCarty
Although the Supreme Court only ruled on the preemption of
community property law in McCarty, the decision was equally applica-
ble to common law jurisdictions. 142 For example, in Hill v. Hill, 143 the
Court of Appeals of Maryland, relying on McCarty, held that military
retirement pay is not marital property subject to division upon di-
vorce.'44 In Hill, the court recognized that the federal preemption issue
could not depend on the doctrines applied in any individual state.1 45
The legitimacy of the Maryland court's decision is further confirmed by
the fact that several common law cases in which the Supreme Court
had granted certiorari were vacated and remanded back to the state
courts for further consideration in light of the McCarty decision. 146
The Supreme Court's failure to address the issue of retroactivity,
resulted in disagreement among state courts as to whether previously
distributed military retirement pay was affected by the McCarty deci-
sion. 147 In In re Marriage of Fellers 48 the California appellate court
refused to reopen a 1977 judgment dividing the husband's military re-
tirement pay, holding that to rule otherwise:
138. Id; see supra note 135.
139. See supra note 125.
140. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 228 (1981).
141. See supra note 112.
142. See In re Marriage of Jones, 309 N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1981); Hill v. Hill, 47 Md.
App. 460, 424 A.2d 783 (1981); see also 2 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION REP. (Panel)
§ 8, at 99 (Feb. 1982).
143. 47 Md. App. 460, 424 A.2d 783 (1981).
144. Id. at 469, 424 A.2d at 785.
145. Id
146. Milhan v. Milhan, 453 U.S. 918 (1981); Miller v. Miller, 453 U.S. 918 (1981).
147. See Erspan v. Badgett, 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir. 1981); Erbe v. Eady, 406 So.2d 936
(Ala. App. 1981); In re Marriage of Fellers, 125 Cal. App. 3d 254, 178 Cal. Rptr.
35 (1981); Exparte Acree, 623 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App. 1981); Braden v. Reno, 8
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2041 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 3, 1981).
148. 125 Cal. App. 3d 254, 178 Cal. Rptr. 35 (1981).
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[W]ould flaunt the rules of res judicata, upset settled property
distributions on which parties have planned their lives and
unsettle judgments entered as long as forty years ago. The
consequences would be devastating, not only from the stand-
point of the litigants but in terms of the workload of the
courts. 4 9
The Alabama and Idaho courts similarly opted for prospective rather
than retroactive application of McCarty. 151 However, in Ex parte
Buckhanan'5' and Ex parte Acree, '52 the Texas courts ruled that Mc-
Carty relates back to the time when Congress first enacted the Military
Retirement Pay Act, reasoning that the Supreme Court did not pre-
empt state court decisions but merely "considered, determined, and
announced what Congress had already done."' 53 These decisions were
doubly alarming in light of the fact that Texas is the only community
property state that does not award alimony or spousal support.
54
Hence, the American Bar Association noted that, unless Congress en-
acts legislation to effectively overrule McCarty, Texas would have to
"pass alimony statutes or else become a dumping ground for the na-
tions's indigent military ex-wives."'I 5
As yet, however, the Supreme Court has not prohibited state
courts from considering the retired member's pay as a relevant factor in
distributing other marital assets or in determining the retiree's ability to
pay alimony or child support.'56 McCarty merely mandated that mili-
tary retirement pay could not be considered as either community or
marital property in allocating marital assets. '- 7  Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court in Ridgway v. Ridgway"' 8 utilized the McCarty ruling
149. Id. at 257, 178 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
150. Erbe v. Eady, 406 So.2d 936 (Ala. App. 1981); Braden v. Reno, 8 FAM. L. REP.
(BNA) 2041 (Idaho Dist. Ct. Nov. 3, 1981).
151. 626 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. 1981).
152. 623 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. App. 1981).
153. See id at 812.
154. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 1, § 3.59 (Vernon Supp. 1982). However, when agree-
ments or contracts to make support payments after divorce are entered into, they
will be held enforceable as any other obligation, so long as the payments are refer-
able to property apportioned by a court. Myrick v. Myrick, 601 S.W.2d 152, 153
(Tex. Civ. App. 1980); Strader v. Strader, 517 S.W.2d 905, 908 (Tex. Civ. App.
1979); Benedict v. Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
155. Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Manpower and Personnel of the Comm. on Armed Services, United States Sen-
ate, on S. 1453, S. 1648 and S. 1814, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. (statement of
Robert D. Arenstein, member of the Exec. Comm. of the N.Y. State Bar's Family
Law Section; Chairman, Comm. on Interstate and Fed. Support Laws and Proce-
dures, on behalf of the Am. Bar Ass'n) (unpublished testimony, available from the
Senate Documents Room for the Comm. on Armed Services); see infra notes 209-
23 and accompanying text.
156. See Higgens v. Higgens, 408 S.W.2d 731 (Fla. 1982); In re Marriage of Jones, 309
N.W.2d 457 (Iowa 1981); In re Marriage of Bedwell, 626 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. 1981).
157. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 228 (1981).
158. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
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as precedent in what appears to be a trend toward a further limiting of
the right of former military spouses.
As part of a divorce decree, and in accordance with the separation
agreement, Richard Ridgway, a career sergeant in the Army, had been
ordered to keep his military life insurance policy in force for the benefit
of his three children.'59 Less than four months after the divorce, he
remarried and designated his new wife as sole beneficiary on that same
policy. 60 As a consequence of the Hisquierdo and McCarty precedent,
the Court reversed the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine's ruling that
Ridgway's beneficiary change superseded the earlier actions of the state
divorce court. 16 1 The United States Supreme Court found congres-
sional intent to preempt state action in the federal statute provisions
granting an insured military member the freedom to designate any per-
son as a beneficiary 16  and precluding creditor attachment of the
proceeds. 63 After McCarty and Ridgway, and before congressional ac-
tion, it was arguable that no award of military benefits upon divorce
would be enforceable, even if voluntarily agreed upon.' 6'
Commentators also expressed concern that the McCarty Court's
preemption theories would be extended to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA).165 ERISA is a comprehensive federal
statute covering all privately funded deferred-benefit plans for those
people engaged in interstate commerce 66 and was enacted for the pur-
pose of ensuring the protection, well-being and security of those work-
ers and their families who had been promised retirement benefits. 167
Based on this purpose, however, and the fact that ERISA does not ex-
pressly provide for federal preemption, it is unlikely that the McCarty
159. Id at 48.
160. Id Sergeant Ridgway changed the policy's beneficiary designation to one di-
recting that its proceeds be paid as specified "by law." Under statutory prescrip-
tion, the proceeds would be paid to his "widow," that is, his "lawful spouse. . . at
the time of his death." 38 U.S.C. § 765(7) (1976).
161. Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46, 63 (1981).
162. 38 U.S.C. § 770(a) (1976).
163. Id § 77 0(g).
164. Am. Bar Ass'n, McCarty v. McCarty: A Possible Nightmare for All Non-Em-
ployee Spouses in the 1980's 12 (Feb. 1982) (unpublished manuscript, available
from the Ain. Bar Ass'n).
165. Foster & Freed, McCarty v. McCarty, Farewell to Alms, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1981,
at 1, col. l;see I. BAXTER, MARITAL PROPERTY § 11.2, at 35 (Supp. 1980); Reppy,
Learning to Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COMM. PROP. J. 5, 18-19 (1979); Reppy, Com-
munity and Separate Interests in Pensions and Social Security Benefts After Mar-
riage of Brown and ERISA, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 417, 511-27 (1978).
166. See 29 U.S.C. § 1001(a) (1976); see also Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten Inc., 450
U.S. 906 (1981); American Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118,
120 (2d Cir. 1979); Reppy, Community and Separate Interests in Pensions and So-
cial Security Benefits After Marriage of Brown and ERISA1, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
417, 511 (1978); Solomon, Beyond Preemptiot rAccomodation of the Non-employee
Spouse's Interest Under ERJS4, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 1021, 1025 (1980).
167. Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten Inc., 450 U.S. 906 (1981); American Telephone
and Telegraph Co. v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118, 120 (2d Cir. 1979).
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decision would provide adequate precedent for preempting divorce
courts from distributing ERISA benefits according to state law. ' 68 Fur-
thermore, unlike military retirement pay, ERISA is merely the regula-
tion of private pension programs by federal law.' 6 9 Moreover, state
decisions since McCarty have unanimously adhered to prior rulings,
holding private pensions divisible as marital property upon divorce. 70
D. Support for the McCarty Decision
"The wife of a serviceman does not work for his service - she
works for him,"' 7' claims John P. Sheffey, Executive Vice President of
the National Association for Uniformed Services (NAUS). NAUS and
a number of other military organizations 72 gave the McCarty decision
its greatest support. Although these proponents recognize that a non-
member spouse's contributions to a military marriage may impose a
tremendous obligation on the serviceman rather than the government,
they asserted that fulfilling that obligation rests with the serviceman
only. 173
The defenders of McCarty claim that it is the serviceman alone
who earns the military retirement pay by bearing the hardships and
dangers of a military career and enduring the mud and cold of field
operations, confinements in battleships, dangers of flight and possible
loss of life or limb in battle or training exercises. 174 In further support
of their position, the proponents of McCarty offer the retired service-
man's subjectivity to active recall and disciplinary action under the
Military Code of Justice.
168. Allessi v. Raybestos-Manhatten Inc., 450 U.S. 906 (1981); Cody v. Reicker, 594
F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979); Provience v. Valley Clerks Trust Fund, 509 F. Supp. 388
(E.D. Cal. 1981); Ohm v. Ohm, 49 Md. App. 392, 431 A.2d 1371 (1981).
169. Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 590 n. 24 (1979).
170. See Deering v. Deering, 292 Md. 115, 127, 437 A.2d 883, 889, 890 (1981); Kikkert
v. Kikkert, 177 N.J. Super. 471, 427 A.2d 76, 79 (1981).
171. Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act." Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Manpower and Personnel of the Comm. on Armed Services, United States Sen-
ate, on S. 1453, S. 1648 and S. 1814, 97th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess. 76 (1981-82)
(statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., Nat'l Ass'n for Uniformed Services
(NAUS)) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings].
172. In Nov. 1980, The Retired Officer's Association joined with six other military ori-
ented associations in filing an amicus curiae brief with the Supreme Court of the
United States in support of Col. McCarty. The six were: Non-Commissioned
Officers Ass'n, Air Force Sergeants Ass'n, Fleet Reserve Ass'n, Reserve Officers
Ass'n, NAUS, and Marine Corps League; see also Senate Hearings, supra note
171, at 69 (statements of Capt. Henry S. Palau, U.S. Navy, Retired, Deputy Direc-
tor for Legislative Affairs, Retired Officers Ass'n).
173. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 76 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P.,
NAUS).
174. See id at 76 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., NAUS); at 70 (statement of
Capt. Henry S. Palau, U.S. Navy, Retired, Deputy Director for Legislative Af-
fairs, Retired Officers Ass'n); at 85 (statement of C.A. "Mack" McKinney, Ser-
geant Major, USMC Retired, Senior V.P. for Gov't Affairs, Non-Commissioned
Officers Ass'n).
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McCarty supporters have voiced the fear that, if states were free to
divide military retirement pay, potential enlistees, recognizing the pos-
sibility of transfer to such states, would be dissuaded from entering the
service. 75 In a letter often cited by McCarty advocates, a serviceman
decries the unjust treatment he received when his wife obtained a di-
vorce in a no-fault community property state while he was confined to
base. 76 Between the attorney's fees and property judgment awarded to
his ex-wife, which included an equal division of his retirement pay, he
claims he was "cleaned out.' 77 Thus, the concern of McCarty propo-
nents is not only based on the fact that a serviceman has no choice as to
where he may be transferred, but also that his lack of mobility may
prevent him from adequately defending his rights in the state his wife
chooses to obtain a divorce.17
8
Proponents cite the average age of a divorced woman, after ten
years of marriage, as between thirty to thirty-five years old. 179 Based
on this statistic, they contend that no justification exists for dividing
retirement pay between a serviceman and his young ex-spouse who is
normally still capable of establishing her own profitable career. 80
Moreover, supporters believe that alimony and social security benefits
are sufficient to adequately compensate the nonmember ex-spouse.'81
An award of military retirement pay upon divorce is viewed as a lux-
ury, not a necessity.
E. Views Against the McCarty Decision
Thus far, the majority of responses to this Supreme Court deci-
sion, including that of the American Bar Association'82 and the De-
partment of Defense,' 83 have been negative.84 Perhaps the strongest
175. Id at 73 (statement of Capt. Henry S. Palau, U.S. Navy, Retired, Deputy Director
for Legislative Affairs, Retired Officers Ass'n).
176. Id at 76, 77 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., NAUS); see also Hearings,
supra note 63, at 87 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., NAUS).
177. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 76 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P.,
NAUS).
178. Id at 76, 78, 79 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., NAUS); see id at 73
(statement of Capt. Henry S. Palau, U.S. Navy, Retired, Deputy Director for Leg-
islative Affairs, Retired Officers Ass'n).
179. Id at 79 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., NAUS).
180. Id at 80-81 (statement of John P. Sheffey, Exec. V.P., NAUS); at 183 (statement
of Lt. Gen. Andrew P. Losue, U.S. Air Force, Deputy Chief of Staff for Man-
power and Personnel, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force).
181. Id at 44 (statement of R. Dean Tice, Lt. Gen., U.S. Army, Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Military Personnel and Force Management); at 83 (state-
ment of C.A. "Mack" McKinney, Sergeant Major, USMC Retired, Senior V.P.
for Gov't Affairs, Non-Commissioned Officers Ass'n).
182. Id. at 105 (panel presentation on behalf of the American Bar Ass'n: Stanford E.
Lerch, Chairman, Section of Family Law; Michael E. Barber, Council Member of
Family Law; Robert D. Arenstein, Chairman, Comm. on Interstate and Fed. Sup-
port Laws and Procedures, Section of Family Law).
183. See id at 139 (statement of Hon. Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of De-
fense (Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics)).
184. Id at 50 (statements of Rosemary Locke, Legislative Chairman, Nat'l Military
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opposition emanates from the many women with the potential to be
detrimentally affected by the decision. This is evidenced by the fact
that the membership of Ex-Partners of Servicemen (Women) For
Equality (EXPOSE), formed in May 1980 to fight the injustices ac-
corded military ex-spouses, 85 grew from ten to two thousand in less
than one year after the McCarty decision. 86 While proponents of Mc-
Carty cite divorce statistics based on the nation as a whole, critics of
the decision cite similarly biased, but perhaps more appropriate, statis-
tics based on the average member of EXPOSE.' 87 The composite of
this person is a fifty-two-year-old woman who was divorced at age
forty-seven. She spent twenty of her twenty-five years with her hus-
band in the military, moving twelve times and raising two children. 88
The experiences of these women provide McCarty adversaries with
their greatest justification for challenging the Supreme Court's
decision.
It is asserted that a spouse's entitlement to military retirement pay
would strengthen rather than weaken the armed services.' 89 The non-
member spouse plays an integral role in the military community, 90
critics claim, not simply working for her husband, but for the better-
ment of the armed services as well. 19 ' Opponents of McCarty believe
Wives Ass'n (NMWA); Suzanne Davis, Chairman, Divorce Study Group,
NMWA); e.g., ABA Family Law Section Hears about Practice Improvement Strate-
gies, 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2653 (1981); Quinn, A Housewife's Lot, NEWSWEEK
(Sept. 14, 1981); Mann, Fair, Washington Post, Sept. 25, 1981 at B1, col. 1; Gar-
ment, Bills Coming Due, Military Ex- Wives Present Theirs, Wall St. J., Aug. 21,
1981 at 18, col. 3; Crawley, Former Military Wives Fight for Their Benefts, Chi-
cago Tribune, Aug. 16, 1981, § 3, at 1, col. 1; Foster & Freed, McCarty v. McCarty,
Farewell to Alms, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 1981 at 1, col. 1; Washington Post, July 9,
1981 (Va. Weekly), at 5 (quote of Nancy Abell, Pres. of Ex-Partners of Service-
men (Women) for Equality (EXPOSE)).
185. EXPOSE, Newsletter (Sept. 1981) (available from EXPOSE, P.O. Box 3269, Falls
Church, Va. 22043).
186. Id
187. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 61 (statements of Nancy Abell, Pres. EX-
POSE; Shirley Taft); see also EXPOSE, Statistics (available from EXPOSE, P.O.
Box 3269, Falls Church, Va. 22043).
188. See authorities cited supra note 187.
189. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 50 (statements of Rosemary Locke, Legislative
Chairman, NMWA; Suzanne Davis, Chairman, Divorce Study Group, NMWA).
190. Id
191. Id at 54-58 (prepared statement of Suzanne Davis, Chairman, Divorce Study
Group, NMWA). This testimony, offered on behalf of NMWA, cites numerous
reports which support this view. For example, General R. H. Barrows, Comman-
dant of the Marine Corps, in Marine Corps Family Service Program Manual (Dec.
28, 1979) is quoted as stating: "The fact is that the well-being and quality of life
of our marine corps family contributes directly to our readiness." A quote is re-
ported from The Navy Leaders Family Manual, which explains that "Many factors
contribute to satisfaction with the Navy. Often mentioned are a sense of mission,
the feeling that good work is appreciated, and a belief that the family's future is
rovided for." Furthermore, a recent study by Dr. Eli Brejer, Chief of Psychiatry
ervice at the Naval Hospital in Beaufort, S.C., reported in Military Family, (Mill-
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that a young wife weighing her future as a military partner will surely
think twice about selecting the military as a way of life when she real-
izes that the government does not attach any worth to her con-
tributions. 92
One of the gravest problems faced by the former nonmilitary
spouse arises as a direct result of the extreme mobility of the military
family. The spouse is virtually incapable of acquiring any marketable
job skills because she is forced to move an average of once every two
and one-half years.'93 Even if she is able to obtain a career promotion,
a new location "inevitably" results in a return to an entry level posi-
tion. 9 4 Not only is she denied the reward of a successful career, but
those job benefits requiring longevity, such as pensions, are effectively
denied her. 195
Normally, the sacrifices endured by the military family are recom-
pensed by the many benefits received, the most treasured of which is
military retirement pay.'9 6 In most cases, this military benefit also con-
stitutes the most valuable marital asset. 197 McCarty, however, prohib-
ited the division of retirement pay upon divorce, thus leaving the
former spouse with nothing to compensate her for the years of service
and sacrifice to her husband's military career. 98 Opponents view this
as the ultimate inequity of the McCarty ruling. The ex-wife of a ser-
viceman is often left with no marketable skills and, consequently, ex-
tremely limited employment opportunities.' 99 The military member,
tary Family Resource Center of YMCA) is cited as showing that "The effects on
children of the father's absence in large measure reflects the mother's adjustment
to her husband's absence .... She should be prepared to involve herself in her
son's activities to the best of her ability. In so doing, the mother is expanding her
parental role into a dual role, being both a mother and to a large extent a father to
the children." Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 54-58.
192. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 58 (prepared statement of Suzanne Davis,
Chairman, Divorce Study Group, NMWA); Hearings, supra note 63, at 40 (quote
of Nancy Abell, Pres. of EXPOSE).
193. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 54 (prepared statement of Suzanne Davis,
Chairman, Divorce Study Group, NMWA); Hearings, supra note 63, at 22 (state-
ment of Hon. Patricia Schroeder, Rep. from Colo.).
194. Senate Hearings, supra note 171, at 54 (prepared by Suzanne Davis, Chairman,
Divorce Study Group, NMWA, this was a quote from a letter received from the
wife of an Air Force officer).
195. Id at 51 (statements of Rosemary Locke, Legislative Chairman, NMWA; Su-
zanne Davis, Chairman, Divorce Study Group, NMWA); Hearings, supra note 63,
at 22 (statement of Hon. Patricia Schroeder, Rep. from Colo.); at 51 (written state-
ment of Hon. Kent R. Lance, Rep. from Texas).
196. Hearings, supra note 63, at 25-31 (letters introduced by Hon. Patricia Schroeder,
Rep. from Colo.); at 122 (statement of Dorothy Norris Pair); CONG. REC. E3451
(daily ed. July 14, 1981) (statement of Hon. Patricia Schroeder, Rep. from Colo.).
197. See authorities cited supra note 196.
198. Hearings, supra note 63, at 25-31 (letters introduced by Hon. Patricia Schroeder,
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on the other hand, normally retires with a lifetime pension and years of
marketable skills which are often employable in a second career that
may provide additional retirement benefits.2°°
Although proponents of McCarty view alimony and social security
benefits as adequate compensation for an ex-wife, opponents realisti-
cally point out that only four percent of the nation's four and one-half
million divorced women actually receive alimony.20 ' Courts are not
always willing to award alimony, and in the state of Texas, alimony is
expressly prohibited.20 2 Moreover, even if alimony is awarded, it gen-
erally terminates upon the death of the compensating spouse.20 3 Social
security benefits are also viewed as insufficient since a former spouse
cannot draw upon them until the military spouse retires and begins
collecting the social security benefits himself.2° Hence, should the mil-
itary member begin another career after retirement and work beyond
age sixty-five, his ex-wife would not be entitled to any benefits.20 5
The Department of Defense recognizes its responsibility to mili-
tary members and their spouses, former spouses, and families.206 Even
some supporters of the McCarty decision admit that their wives actu-
ally deserve half of their retirement pay.207 Yet despite the Supreme
Court's recognition of the plight of the ex-wife,2 °8 the Court's holding
illustrates that there is a wide chasm between deserving something and
actually receiving it.
IV. Congressional Response to McCarty
Members of Congress, in reacting to these inequities, have passed
a bill which amends Title X of the United States Code and effectively
overrides the McCarty decision. 2°  This law returns jurisdiction to
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state divorce courts, subject to a number of exceptions.2"'
According to the new law, a military couple does not need to be
married for any minimum number of years before the state courts can
consider the retirement pay as marital property. 21' Furthermore, if the
retirement pay is divided upon divorce it is not discontinued upon the
remarriage of the nonmember spouse.2 12 However, state courts cannot
treat retirement pay as property unless jurisdiction over the member is
conferred by reason of the member's consent, residence or domicile in
the state.21 3 A court order will not be effective if the serviceman resides
in a state solely because of his military assignment. 2 4 A serviceman is
permitted to voluntarily assign survivors benefits to a former spouse,215
and the retirement pay may be garnished in an effort to satisfy a court
award of property other than retirement pay.216 Furthermore, those
spouses who were married to a serviceman during twenty years of ac-
tive duty, if they remain unmarried, may continue to receive military
health treatment.217
- In regard to the retroactive effect of the law, Congress has not pro-
hibited the reopening of any cases decided after the date of the Mc-
Carty ruling.2'8 Moreover, the legislative history specifically states that
changes made to final court orders, effected in order to implement the
holding of the McCarty decision, should not be recognized.21 9 Never-
theless, it is also asserted that courts should not favorably consider re-
opening those decisions rendered prior to McCarty if they did not
divide the military retirement pay.220
The new law also includes provisions designed to protect the ser-
viceman. For example, award of military retirement pay upon divorce
does not create a right, title, or interest in the former spouse which can
be sold.22" ' A fifty percent limit is placed on the amount of retirement
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pay available to satisfy a court order222 and a court may not direct a
serviceman to retire at a particular time to effectuate any award.223
V. CONCLUSION
The McCarty decision, prohibiting the division of military retire-
ment pay upon divorce, provoked a myriad of emotional and legal re-
actions. The Supreme Court's unique approach to the issue of federal
preemption and the subsequent use of McCarty as precedent in Ridg-
way further aggravated the confusion surrounding the division of prop-
erty in divorce litigation. Now that President Reagan has signed a law
which effectively overrides the McCarty decision, most of the confusion
should be alleviated. However, the effects of the ruling in McCarty
should not be underestimated or forgotten. Before enactment of the
new law, it was written of the Supreme Court's decision that, "the les-
son is clear: the spouses of military personnel are not marital partners,
rather they are civilian casualties."224 While the ultimate result of
overturning McCarty did aid the former spouse in the battle for the
recognition of legitimately earned rights to military retirement pay, the
fact remains that the Supreme Court misinterpreted congressional si-
lence, which forced military spouses to defend a right that should never
have been deprived them. The lesson is indeed clear, there is still a
long way to go before a spouse's contribution is fully recognized and
peace can finally be declared.
Ellen LS Koplow
222. Id § 1408(e)(1).
223. Id § 1408(c)(3).
224. Foster & Freed, McCarty v. McCarty: Farewell to Alms?, N.Y.L.J., July 31, 198 1,
at 2, col. 4.
19821
